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Many years ago, two avid followers of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977' ("the Act" or "SMCRA")
observed that the status of the valid existing rights ("VER")
exemption "remains murky and uncertain as the fifth anniver-
sary of the Act approaches-and promises to remain so for some
months after that date." ' 2 Little did they know how correct their
prognostication was.
Today, as the thirteenth anniversary of the Act nears, that
assessment remains true. During SMCRA's lifetime, the Office
of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement ("OSM" or
"the agency") has promulgated two regulations defining VER,3
only to see one remanded for revision and the other invalidated
Pub. L. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988)).
2 Macleod and Means, When It Is Suitable to Be Unsuitable: An Analysis of the
Exemptions From the Surface Mining Act's Prohibitions on Mining, 3 EASTERN MIN.
L. INST. § 7.03[4], at 7-24 (1982).
3 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1979); 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1983).
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for inadequate notice and opportunity to comment. 4 Most re-
cently, a third definition was proposed
5 and then withdrawn. 6
There has been much movement, but no progress, as the agency
has grappled with competing interests, the legislative history of
the Act and the constitutional prohibition against takings with-
out just compensation.7
The three words that have caused so much trouble are part
of Section 522(e) of the Act,8 which designates certain areas as
per se unsuitable for surface coal mining operations. Included
are certain lands that are protected for the benefit of all citizens,
such as lands within national parks, 9 wilderness areas,' 0 and
federal lands within national forests.' Also included are certain
lands that are protected for the benefit of individual citizens,
such as lands in "buffer zone" areas around public roads,
2
occupied dwellings, 3 and public buildings. 4 Those prohibitions
4 In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1083 (D. D.C. 1980) ("PSMRL I"); In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig.,
22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1557 (D. D.C. 1985) ("PSMRL II"), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nor. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("NWF
v. Hodel").
1 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988).
6 54 Fed. Reg. 30,557 (1989).
' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
I SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
9 SMCRA § 522(e)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1) (1988).
10 Id.
11 SMCRA § 522(e)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2) (1988).
12 SMCRA § 522(e)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(4) (1988).
13 SMCRA § 522(e)(5), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(5) (1988).
" SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988). In its entirety, this section of the
Act provides as follows:
(e) After the enactment of this Act and subject to valid existing rights no
surface coal mining operations except those which exist on the date of
enactment of this Act shall be permitted-
(1) on any lands within the boundaries of units of the National Park
System, the National Wildlife Refuge Systems, the National System of
Trails, the National Wilderness Preservation System, the Wild and Scenic
Rivers System, including study rivers designated under section 5(a) of the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and National Recreation Areas designated by
Act of Congress;
(2) on any Federal lands within the boundaries of any national forest:
Provided, however, That surface coal mining operations may be permitted
on such lands if the Secretary finds that there are no significant recrea-
tional, timber, economic, or other values which may be incompatible with
such surface mining operations and-
(A) surface operations and impacts are incident to an underground coal
mine; or
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on mining, however, are expressly made "subject to valid exist-
ing rights."' 5
But what do those words mean? What is the scope of the
exemption they provide? The Act does not define them and they
have now eluded successful regulatory definition for nearly thir-
teen years.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES AND THE REGULATORY
CHOICES
In analyzing Section 522(e), there is an evident tension be-
tween the protection of property rights and protection of the
environment. As we have moved from regulatory attempt to
regulatory attempt over the years, the meaning of VER has
swung back and forth between those extremes, getting closer to
the one in this Administration and closer to the other in that.
Those who favor protection of the environment without regard
to business interests have naturally favored a very narrow ex-
emption. Those who are engaged in mining and would stand to
lose their mineral interests under the prohibitions have naturally
favored a broader exemption. But the fact is that Congress
provided for both environmental and property rights protection,
(B) where the Secretary of Agriculture determines, with respect to lands
which do not have significant forest cover within those national forests
west of the 100th meridian, that surface mining is in compliance with the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, the Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act of 1975, the National Forest Management Act of 1976,
and the provisions of this Act: And provided further, That no surface coal
mining operations may be permitted within the boundaries of the Custer
National Forest;
(3) which will adversely affect any publicly owned park or places included
in the National Register of Historic Sites unless approved jointly by the
regulatory authority and the Federal, State, or local agency with jurisdiction
over the park or the historic site;
(4) within one hundred feet of the outside right-of-way line of any public
road, except where mine access roads or haulage roads join such right-of-
way line and except that the regulatory authority may permit such roads
to be relocated or the area affected to lie within one hundred feet of such
road, if after public notice and opportunity for public hearing in the locality
a written finding is made that the interests of the public and the landowners
affected thereby will be protected; or
(5) within three hundred feet from any occupied dwelling, unless waived
by the owner thereof, nor within three hundred feet of any public building,
school, church, community or institutional building, public park, or within
one hundred feet of a cemetery.
is Id.
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through the prohibitions and the VER exemption from those
prohibitions. Any regulatory definition of VER must accom-
modate, in the proper balance, both of those congressional
objectives.
The regulatory effort should begin with an assessment of
what the regulation is intended to accomplish. First and fore-
most, it must carry out the will of Congress. In this case, that
means striking the proper balance between the polar extremes.
If the regulation does not do that, at least within acceptable
limits, 6 it will likely be invalidated on judicial review as "incon-
sistent with law.' ' 7 The regulation must comply not only with
SMCRA but also with all other laws, including, of course, the
Constitution.
18
These are necessary attributes of any regulatory definition
of VER. In addition, particularly given the complexities of
SMCRA with its varying federal and state administration, it
would be desirable to have a regulation that is reasonably easy
to administer. It would be desirable that the regulatory formula
produce predictable and consistent results. And it would be
important that the regulation have some promise of general
finality, so that its implementation will not normally generate
additional litigation and impose recurrent and very large costs
on the governments and citizens of the United States and the
several states.
In reality, it is not likely that any regulatory definition of
VER will achieve all of these objectives as fully as OSM and the
affected public would like. Compliance with SMCRA and the
Constitution is mandatory; the question is where to make com-
promises among the remaining objectives. It appears to be that
difficulty which has caused the long regulatory paralysis.
There are a number of major and minor regulatory options
that have been advanced, or at least considered, to date. The
three major choices, each of which has progressed to some level
of rulemaking, are (a) the modified all permits test, (b) the
takings test, and (c) the ownership and authority test. Two other
16 In formulating a regulation, an agency is entitled to reasonable latitude in
interpreting the statute it is administering. See NWF v. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 734-35, 741.
,1 Regulations promulgated by the Secretary are subject to judicial review in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30
U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1988). They will be upheld unless the court finds them "arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law." Id.
is Id.
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regulatory options should also be considered, to give perspective
to the major choices if for no other reason. Those are (d) the
ownership test, and (e) the making of case-by-case VER deter-
minations, either with or without a guiding regulation. Our
purpose in this article is to analyze these regulatory choices,
noting the strengths and weaknesses of each and the compro-
mises it would entail. We will do so against the background of
certain necessary guideposts for the interpretation of Section
522(e). But first, a history lesson must be provided.
II. THE HISTORY OF VER REGULATION UNDER SMCRA
A. The First Definition: The "All Permits" Test
1. Regulatory Requirements
In March 1979, the Secretary of the Interior promulgated
the voluminous first permanent program regulations under Sec-
tion 501(b) of the Act.' 9 The regulations included a restrictive
definition of VER for purposes of Section 522(e). Under that
definition, VER was to preserve only those property rights in
existence on August 3, 1977 that authorized the applicant to
mine, and then only if the applicant had either obtained all of
the necessary state and federal permits as of that date or could
demonstrate that the coal in question was both needed for and
immediately adjacent to an ongoing operation for which he
possessed all permits as of that date.20 Lest there be any doubt
about the definition's narrow scope, the regulation expressly
ruled out other less perfected rights, such as "coal exploration
permits or licenses, applications for bids on leases, or where a
person has only applied for a state or federal permit."
'2'
The Secretary based the definition on a threefold rationale.
First, he felt compelled to distinguish the VER exemption in
Section 522(e) from the "substantial legal and financial com-
" 44 Fed. Reg. 14,901 (1979). In all, the regulations and preamble spanned 562
pages in the Federal Register.
30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1979), 44 Fed. Reg. at 15,342 (1979).
, Id. The same regulation also contained a generic disclaimer that VER "does not
mean mere expectation of a right to conduct surface coal mining operations or the right
to conduct underground coal mining." Id.
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mitments" ("SLFC") exemption in Section 522(a)(6), which de-
scribes the exemption applicable to unsuitability designations
sought by petition. 22 In the Secretary's view, the prohibitions of
Section 522(e) were mandated directly by Congress rather than
left up to private petition, thus implying the need for a greater
property interest to qualify for Section 522(e) VER than for the
Section 522(a)(6) SLFC exemption.
23
Second, the Secretary identified legislative history to the
effect that the VER provision was intended to avoid constitu-
tional takings and the attendant compensation requirement of
the Fifth Amendment. The Secretary claimed that he had defined
VER in terms of "those rights which cannot be affected without
paying compensation. '" 24 He also stated that the definition in-
corporated the notion that the conveyance creating the property
interest must have contemplated mining by the intended mining
method if it is to create VER for that method.25
Third, the Secretary elaborated on the law of takings, noting
that the relevant cases fell into two interrelated categories-
diminution of value, and noxious use. The former finds a taking
only if there is no remaining use for the property-a result the
Secretary claimed justified defining VER differently for ongoing
mines and potential new mines. The latter category involves the
use of the government's police power to prevent some harmful
use of property, and in the Secretary's view could justify inter-
ference with property interests even if the loss of value were 100
percent .26
The delineation of the Secretary's rationale in this preamble
has proven important beyond its immediate purpose of justifying
the first VER definition. Indeed, in the short term the rationale
11 Section 522(a)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6), provides:
The requirements of this section shall not apply to lands on which surface
coal mining operations are being conducted on the date of enactment of
this Act or under a permit issued pursuant to this Act, or where substantial
legal and financial commitments in such operation were in existence prior
to January 4, 1977.
See 44 Fed. Reg. 14,991-92.
2, 44 Fed. Reg. at 14,992 (1979) (discussing 123 CONG. REc. H12,878 (daily ed.
Apr. 29, 1977) (statement of Rep. Udall) (incorrectly cited as the Apr. 20 ed. in the
Federal Register notice).
44 Fed. Reg. at 14,992 (1979) (citing United States v. Polino, [131] F. Supp.
722 (N.D. W. Va. 1955)) (incorrectly cited as vol. 133 of F. Supp. in the Federal Register
notice).
2 44 Fed. Reg. at 14,992 (1979) (discussing Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
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failed, because the district court found the definition too restric-
tive. 27 But over the years the rationale has laid the groundwork
for the debate over VER that remains alive to this day.
2. Judicial Response
Both industry and environmental groups challenged the reg-
ulatory definition of VER under Section 526(a)(1) of the Act.
28
The National Coal Association and American Mining Congress
("NCA/AMC") argued that the Secretary had narrowed the
VER exemption to the point of negation. NCA/AMC urged that
VER be redefined so as not to require all permits as a precon-
dition to VER, but rather to carry out Congress' intent of
recognizing property rights that were valid and existing under
state law interpreting mining rights. The industry contended that
the Secretary had misinterpreted existing case law on VER, which
made clear that "VER" is a statutory shorthand for preserving
all property rights established under prior laws from destruction
upon the enactment of a new statutory scheme. The industry
also maintained that the Secretary should have interpreted VER
less restrictively in order to avoid constitutional problems under
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
29
Notwithstanding the definition's narrowness, the National
Wildlife Federation and a coalition of environmentalist groups
("NWF") challenged it as overbroad. In NWF's view, the reg-
ulation would permit greater avoidance of the prohibitions than
Congress had intended. In particular, NWF attacked the "need
and adjacent" element of the definition, arguing that an oper-
ator who satisfied it must still have possessed all permits in order
to qualify for VER.30
Before the court announced its decision, the Secretary con-
ceded industry's point that state law should control the interpre-
tation of any documents relied on to establish VER. The court
noted that the Secretary had agreed to revise the regulation to
27 See PSMRL 1, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1090-92 (D.D.C. 1980).
" SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1988), provides for judicial review
of the Secretary's national rules or regulations in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia. The Secretary's action is to be affirmed unless the court concludes that it
was "arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law." Id.
PSMRL I, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1090-91.
" See Id. at 1091.
[VOL. 5:693
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provide that state law governed, not the more anomalous "usage
and custom" standard specified in the regulation. 3
The court rejected NWF's claim that the need and adjacent
test impermissibly expanded the concept of VER, holding that
the regulation in this respect was a rational method of avoiding
takings. The court found that this test was consistent with Su-
preme Court declarations regarding taking of property, in that
it recognized a VER exemption when necessary to maintain, as
a whole, the value of the property to the VER applicant.
3 2
The court was similarly unreceptive to most of industry's
remaining arguments. It declined to reach the merits of what it
perceived to be NCA/AMC's constitutional challenge to the
regulation, holding that the issue was premature because there
were no specific facts enabling the court to adjudicate the takings
question.3 3 In reality, the industry had merely argued that the
statute should be construed to avoid the constitutional question,
and that VER should therefore be defined more broadly to avoid
violating the takings clause. That argument went unaddressed in
the court's opinion.
As to the crucial "all permits test," the court accepted the
premise that VER could be defined with reference to permits,
but remanded the regulation for modification. It rejected as
"self-defeating" OSM's position that the operator must actually
have obtained all permits in order to have VER. Recognizing
that an operator who has applied for the permits but fails to
receive one or more through governmental delay possesses the
same expectations and has made the same investments as one
who timely receives all permits, the court remanded the all
permits test to the Secretary, holding "that a good faith attempt
to obtain all permits before the August 3, 1977 cut-off date
should suffice for meeting the all permits test." 34
11 See Id. at 1090; 44 Fed. Reg. at 15,342 (1979).
32 PSMRL 1, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1091 (citing Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31; Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)).
1 PSMRL 1, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1091.
14 Id. VER and other issues were appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. That court never ruled on the issues because while
the appeals were pending, the Reagan Administration took office and embarked on a
wide-ranging program of regulatory reform. Then Interior Secretary James Watt an-
nounced his intention to repromulgate the SMCRA permanent program regulations.
Therefore, the entire case was remanded to the Secretary, because it was expected that
the new regulations would largely moot the issues on appeal. See NWF v. Hodel, 839
F.2d at 702.
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Contemporaneous with PSMRL I, the Act was the subject
of a separate constitutional challenge in Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc.35 That case pre-
sented the question whether SMCRA violated the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against governmental takings of private
property without payment of just compensation. In the absence
of a specific factual situation, the Supreme Court concluded that
the "mere enactment" of SMCRA did not constitute a taking.
3 6
Though the Court did not reach the substantive issue of
VER, it noted the district court's remand of the all permits test
in PSMRL I, and observed that the all permits "interpretation
of the exception is not compelled by either the statutory language
or its legislative history."37
3. The Secretary's Interpretations and Representations
The Secretary's representations during this rulemaking and
litigation were not a model of consistency. The all permits reg-
ulation on its face left no room for alternative methods of
finding VER, other than the need and adjacent test. Yet even
while promulgating this regulation, OSM hinted that VER might
exist where the all permits test could not be met. The Secretary
explained in the rulemaking preamble that VER is a site-specific
concept that must take each applicant's particular circumstances
into account. In his view, the regulation meant that VER must
be applied case-by-case, but with no doubt about the presence
of VER where an applicant had all permits for the area as of
August 3, 1977.38
Later, in the appeal of PSMRL I, the Secretary again at-
tempted to expand the facial restrictiveness of the VER defini-
tion. He stated that while one of the purposes of the all permits
test was to make clear that there are valid existing rights where
all permits have been obtained by August 3, 1977, in the absence
of all permits, the agency would look for the presence of VER
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
36 Id. at 295-6.
7 Id. at 296, n. 37. In a later ruling in the permanent program litigation, the D.C.
Circuit reiterated this point. NWF v. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 750 n. 86. Through an
apparently inadvertent error, the Secretary subsequently misquoted the D.C. Circuit as
reaching the opposite conclusion. See 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988).
38 44 Fed. Reg. at 14,993 (1979).
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on a case-by-case basis.3 9 Still later, with the benefit of several
years' hindsight, the Secretary explained that the 1979 rule, like
the rule the Secretary was then proposing, "did not attempt to
specify all situations where VER exists." Instead, under the 1979
rules, VER could also be found "if under all the facts, a taking
would occur, but for VER." 4
The Secretary made similar representations to the Supreme
Court. In his reply brief in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Association, the Secretary informed the Court
that the all permits VER definition "was intended to provide
only that one way in which a mine operator could conclusively
establish his 'valid existing rights' was to show that all necessary
permits had been obtained before the passage of the Act."
4'
Any regulation to the contrary, the Secretary continued, would
not be in accord with Congress' intent.
These explanations, however, do not comport with still other
statements made in the 1979 final rulemaking. At that time,
OSM stated that Congress' purpose in passing the VER exception
was to avoid any takings that would require compensation under
the Constitution. Accordingly, OSM claimed that the all permits
definition of VER would give full effect to this requirement,
rather than simply being one way of implementing it. 42 Thus,
what OSM really meant in 1979 remains unclear to this day.
4. Suspension of the Regulation
The court's remand of the VER definition had the legal
effect of invalidating the regulation insofar as it required the
operator to have obtained all permits prior to the date of
SMCRA's enactment. Six months later, the Secretary published
a notice of suspension of that aspect of the definition, noting
that pending further rulemaking, the Secretary would interpret
the regulation as "requiring a good faith effort to obtain all
permits. ' 43 Still later, after the change of Administrations in
19 Macleod and Means, supra note 2, at 7-24.
41 Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Their Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment (Oct. 19, 1984) at 6-7.
41 Reply Brief for the Acting Secretary of the Interior at 5-6, Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), quoted in Macleod
and Means, supra note 2, at 7-19.
42 44 Fed. Reg. at 14,992 (1979).
41 45 Fed. Reg. at 51,548 (1980).
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January 1981, the new Administration announced its intention
to repromulgate the SMCRA permanent program regulations.
The pending appeal of the all permits standard was thus "over-
taken by events" and was never decided by the D.C. Circuit."
B. The Second Definition: The "Takings" Test
1. Regulatory Requirements
In June 1982, OSM proposed revised regulations with the
overall goal of "removing burdensome or counterproductive
rules" and giving the states flexibility to implement the unsuit-
ability process for federal lands more efficiently.45 OSM pro-
posed three options for VER. The first option essentially took
the previous definition and added "good faith efforts." Under
the proposed definition, VER would exist if the applicant had
made good faith efforts to obtain, on or before August 3, 1977,
all permits necessary to conduct coal mining operations. The
agency admitted that this would be the most restrictive of the
three options.46
The second option was at the opposite end of the spectrum.
All that would be needed to find VER under this definition was
ownership of the coal. In explaining this option, the Secretary
rejected the agency's earlier rationale that the SLFC exemption
from discretionary prohibitions in Section 522(a) implied the
need for even greater property interests to qualify for the VER
exemption from the congressionally mandated prohibitions in
Section 522(e). 47 The Secretary explained, correctly, that the
legislative history did not support a connection between VER
and SLFC, but rather showed only that Congress meant VER
to be defined based on previous court decisions, which of course
vary from state to state. 48 To ensure consistency of treatment,
See NWF v. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 702.
47 Fed. Reg. 25,278 (1982). The proposal covered not only VER, but the broader
issue of designating lands as unsuitable for mining under Section 522 of the Act.
" Id. at 27,279-80. This option would also define "needed for," in the needed
for and adjacent to test, to mean mining necessary to make the operation, as a whole,
economically feasible. Id.
,' See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
47 Fed. Reg. 25,280 (citing H. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95
(1977)[reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CoNG. ADMIN. NEWS 593, 631]; H. REP. No. 1445,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976); S. REP. No. 28, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1976); S.
REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1977)).
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the Secretary proposed to make ownership of coal on August 3,
1977 dispositive of VER. OSM expected this definition to create
a "significant expansion in the number of areas having VER.
' '49
The third option took a middle position. To establish VER,
the applicant would have to show that it both owned the coal
and had the right to mine it by the "method intended." 50 OSM
claimed that this definition was based on United States v. Po-
lino,5' which the legislative history cited as an example of how
VER should be subject to previous court interpretations. 5 2 In
Polino, the court faced the question whether a coal company
had properly reserved the right to conduct surface mining op-
erations on land that it had conveyed to the United States. In
1917, the Davis Land Company had conveyed land to the gov-
ernment subject to the restriction that the company, and its
successors and assignees, had the right to mine and remove
minerals from the land. After several conveyances, Bowden Coal
Company began mining the area, in part by surface mining a
16.3 acre location." The United States then brought suit.
After concluding that West Virginia law applied by reason
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins54 and analyzing several West
Virginia cases, the court held that the company did not have the
right to conduct surface mining. Its decision was based on two
rationales: first, both parties were aware that the United States
planned to use the land for forestry purposes, a usage that the
court without any analysis concluded was incompatible with
surface mining; and second, because surface mining was not in
use in that area of West Virginia when the land was conveyed
to the United States, the parties could not have intended the
reservation of rights to encompass surface mining, but only
underground mining."
47 Fed. Reg. at 25,280.
5'Id.
131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. W. Va. 1955).
52 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CONG.
ADMIN. NEWS 593, 631. That report incorrectly cited the case as 133 F.Supp. 722
(D.W.V. 1955), an error which has been repeated in the regulatory preambles. E.g., 47
Fed. Reg. at 25,280 (1982).
" Polino, 131 F. Supp. at 772-74.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
" Polino, 131 F. Supp. at 775-77. There is no indication that the court was ever
presented with, or considered, the possibility that following the surface mining the land
could be restored.
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Ultimately, OSM rejected all three options. Instead, under
the definition promulgated, an applicant would be found to
possess valid existing rights:
for an area protected under section 522(e) of the Act on August
3, 1977, if the application of any of the prohibitions contained
in that section to the property interest that existed on that date
would effect a taking of the person's property which would
entitle the person to just compensation under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
56
OSM reached this decision after reviewing the extensive com-
ments it had received on the proposed options, which caused it
to conclude that none of the proposed definitions "adequately
define[d]" VER. 57 According to OSM, commenters had criticized
each option as overinclusive or underinclusive, and many com-
menters raised the issue of a taking without just compensation.
Since judicial precedents on takings did not present a bright line
test to determine when compensation was necessary for a regu-
latory taking, the agency believed it was impossible to delineate
a class of circumstances with any assurance that it would accu-
rately track all potential takings. Therefore, the agency adopted





Several environmental organizations as well as the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Environmental Resources challenged this
16 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg. at 41,349 (1983). This test is less
protective of property rights than the proposed ownership test. Under the takings test,
VER would only be found if denial of VER would result in a taking. Under the ownership
test, all that the applicant needed to show was that it owned the coal.
48 Fed. Reg. at 41,313 (1983).
58 Id. at 41,314. In addition to the three options, the agency also announced that
it was considering three additional options. In the first, all that would be needed to
establish VER was ownership of the coal as of August 3, 1977. However, unlike the
primary ownership test, valid existing rights could not be transferred to subsequent
owners of the coal. Alternatively, VER could be defined to exist when the applicant
possessed ownership of the coal and the right to mine the coal by any method, rather
than the right to mine it by the method the applicant intended to use. In the third
variation, VER would be found when the applicant had ownership of the coal, the right




regulation on procedural grounds. 59 They claimed that its prom-
ulgation violated the Administrative Procedure Act, because the
final regulation was so different from the proposed options that
a new notice and comment period was necessary. 60 The govern-
ment, supported by industry intervenors, argued that the regu-
lation was a logical outgrowth of the proposals, that the 1979
rule included a takings component, that another portion of the
proposed regulations provided reasonable notice of the definition
adopted, and that the plaintiffs had actual notice of the defini-
tion ultimately selected.
61
The court sided with the plaintiffs and remanded the regu-
lation without reaching any substantive issues. 62 In the court's
view, a new notice and comment period would provide the first
occasion for the public to criticize the regulation as promulgated.
The court disagreed that the 1979 rulemaking put plaintiffs on
notice of the takings component, because the all permits rule as
then promulgated contained "no such alternate method of ob-
taining VER." 63 It also disagreed that proposed Section 761.5(d),
which provided that VER would exist where no reasonable use
of the property other than surface coal mining existed, fore-
shadowed the takings rule. In the court's view, that proposal
merely illustrated one instance in which courts have found tak-
ings; it did not alert the parties that a takings standard was
among OSM's proposed options.64
Following the court's decision, the Secretary suspended the
regulation, indicating that it would once again revert to using
the 1979 all permits definition, with the "good faith" language
the court had earlier suggested. 65 Ironically, this policy decision
effectively replaced a definition of VER that had been over-
turned solely on procedural grounds with one that had been
severely criticized in the comments to the 1982 proposal.
19 See PSMRL 11, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1557 (D. D.C. 1985).
60 Id. at 1558-64.
61 Id. at 1559-62.
11 Id. at 1564.
63 Id. at 1561 (emphasis in original). The court thus effectively nullified the
Secretary's earlier waffling on the exclusivity of the all permits test under the 1979
regulations. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
" 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1562. In particular, the court noted that industry's
comments during rulemaking had all addressed one or more of the mechanical tests
OSM had proposed, not a takings test, and that OSM's responses to comments did not
address commenters' objections to the takings test, but only their objections to the
specific proposed options. Id. at 1562-64.
61 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,954 (1986).
1989-90]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
C. "Continually Created VER"
1. The Regulatory Provision
At the same time that the agency proposed the three options
for VER in 1982, it also proposed a regulation that would permit
VER to be "continually created" as new land became subject
to the per se rule against coal mining operations.6 Unlike with
VER, however, the agency adopted the exact regulation it had
proposed. 67 Under the regulation, VER would be found if, on
the date the land became protected under Section 522(e) of the
Act, either (1) a "validly authorized surface coal mining opera-
tion" was already present on the land, or (2) the Section 522(e)
prohibition, if applied to the property interest existing on that
date, would create a compensible taking.6
In other words, an applicant would no longer need to possess
VER as of August 3, 1977, the date SMCRA was enacted.
Rather, it would be sufficient that the applicant possess VER as
of the later date on which the land at issue became subject to
protection.
69
2. The Judicial Response
NWF challenged the continually created VER regulation,
claiming it was inconsistent with the language and legislative
history of SMCRA.7 0 It argued that Section 522(e)'s use of the
term "existing" precluded the creation of VER after the date
the Act became law. 7' The court rejected this argument, agreeing
with the government that because the Act was silent as to VER
47 Fed. Reg. at 25,281 (1982).
6 48 Fed. Reg. at 41,314-15 (1983).
- 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg. at 41,349 (1983).
For example, if a town were now to build a public school, Section 522(e) would
prohibit mining within 300 feet of the new building, absent VER. However, if the school
were built within 300 feet of an existing mining operation, then the operation could
continue under the concept of continually created VER even if the mining operation
came into existence after August 3, 1977. Without the continually created VER regula-
tion, the mine operator would have to cease operations in that area.
70 See PSMRL 11, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1564. Initially they also claimed
that the concept of continually created VER was inconsistent with the court's decision
in the challenge to the all permits test. At oral argument, however, they admitted that
continually created VER was never an issue in that decision. Id. at 1564 n. 7.
7 Id. at 1564.
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for those areas that became protected after the date of enact-
ment, the rule was "in accord with the Congress' desire to avoid
takings." '7 2 Although it approved the concept of continually
created VER, the court remanded the portion of the regulation
that incorporated the procedurally defective takings test. It left
intact the provision that VER would be found to exist if, on the
date the land became subject to the prohibition on mining, a
validly authorized surface coal mining operation was already
present.
73
NWF appealed the district court's ruling. 74 It argued that a
"continually-created valid existing right is an oxymoron," and
therefore arbitrary and contrary to Congress' intent. But the
district court's decision was affirmed. The D.C. Circuit looked
to the legislative history of the Act and concluded that, "the
House committee made clear that operating mines should not be
shut down: 'The designation process is not intended to be used
as a process to close existing mine operations, although the area
in which such operations are located may be designated with
respect to future mines."' 75 Significantly, it added that "the
legislative history ... does suggest that Congress did not intend
to infringe on valid property rights or effect takings through
[Section] 522(e).' '76
D. The Proposed Rules of December 1988
1. The Regulatory Provision
At the close of the Reagan Administration, OSM came to
bat for a third time in an attempt to promulgate a regulatory
definition of VER. 77 OSM proposed two options-a "good faith-
all permits" test, and an "ownership and authority" test. Under
either test, as an initial hurdle, an applicant would have to show
that it had a legal right to the coal under some document such
72 Id.
13 Id. at 1564-65.
7, See NWF v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The lower court's decision
to remand that part of the continually created VER regulation that incorporated the
takings test was not appealed.
71 Id. at 750 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADwN. NEWS 593, 631).
76 Id.
' 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988).
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as a deed, conveyance, lease or contract.78 The right must have
existed as of either August 3, 1977 or the date the land in
question became subject to Section 522(e), whichever was later.
79
The documents used to prove the existence of the right would
be interpreted according to state law.
After establishing that it had the legal right to the coal, the
applicant would have to show that it could satisfy either the
good faith all permits test or the ownership and authority test,
whichever was ultimately adopted. 0 Under the former test, the
agency would look at whether the operator had applied for all
the permits necessary to commence mining prior to the date that
use of the land had been restricted.81 Under the ownership and
authority test, the applicant would have to show that as of the
date the Section 522(e) prohibitions became effective, it pos-
sessed the property right necessary for it to conduct mining by
the method the applicant intended to use.82 In proposing the
regulations, OSM acknowledged that the ownership and author-
ity test would give effect to Congress' concern that takings be
avoided.83
2. The Public Response
The proposed regulations generated a flood of comments to
the agency. Paradoxically, that flood lacked much real water.
Out of the approximately 4,500 comments that OSM received
during the four month comment period, more than 4,400 were
notes and letters from private citizens, many of which responded
to an orchestrated campaign by NWF. 84 The vast majority of
these "comments" made no attempt to address the substance of
the proposals. Rather, in response to NWF's plea, they expressed
78 Id. at 52,376.
79 In this respect, the proposal reflected the concept of continually created VER
that the courts had previously approved. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text;
53 Fed. Reg. at 52,376 (1988).
10 Alternatively, the applicant could show that it satisfied the needed for and
adjacent to test. 53 Fed. Reg. at 52,376 (1988).
I1 d. at 52,378.
12 Id. at 52,377. The meaning of "method" is not entirely free from doubt. OSM
used the term to distinguish surface mining methods from underground mining methods.
Id. But "method" might also be construed to refer to a specific mining technique within
one of the two broad categories.
83 Id.
" OSM, Public Comments on VER Proposal at 1 (Feb. 14, 1990).
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opposition to all coal mining in areas subject to Section 522(e)
of the Act, or expressed opposition to all of the proposals then
on the table.
85
The substantive comments broke down along fairly predict-
able lines, the only wild cards being the states and state and
federal agencies. Twenty-eight industry commenters, along with
several states and federal agencies, supported the ownership and
authority test, concluding that it gave effect to the congressional
intent to prevent takings. Most of the comments by industry
also asked OSM to confirm that in requiring an applicant to
have the authority to mine by the method intended, it was
referring not to specific mining techniques, but only to the
distinction between surface mining and underground mining.
Among the commenters opposing the ownership and authority
test were NWF and one state.
Twenty-nine commenters, including a handful of states and
several environmental organizations, supported the good faith-
all permits test.8 6 Nine parties, including two states, opposed this
test because it would result in regulatory takings for which
compensation would have to be paid. Among the miscellaneous
comments were one from Illinois supporting a takings test for
VER and two, both from Ohio, suggesting that OSM adopt a
case-by-case approach in lieu of either of the proposed regula-
tions 87
3. Withdrawal of the Proposal
The third attempt to define VER never reached the eyes of
a court. Instead, following the change in Administrations in
1989, OSM first extended the comment period, and then with-
drew the proposals from consideration altogether.8
In extending the comment period, OSM stated that the Sec-
retary of the Interior was "very concerned about the complex
11 This tactic may foreshadow what we would regard as an unfortunate trend
toward the "politicization" of the rulemaking function. With a staff of 550 and a
budget of $70 million, NWF is a big business. 1 BURzK, KOaK & NOVALLO, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF AssocIATIONs 425 (24th ed. 1990). If it should make a practice of allocating its
resources to efforts of this sort, agencies and reviewing courts will become buried by
administrative records, and important legal issues will be obscured.
86 OSM, Public Comments on VER Proposal at 2 (Feb. 14, 1990).
Id. at 3.
54 Fed. Reg. at 9,848 and 30,557 (1989).
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and difficult problem of valid existing rights to mine in areas
otherwise protected from mining by the Act." 9 The Secretary
hoped that with additional time to comment, "interested parties
[would] ... suggest additional options .... If other viable
options are suggested, the Secretary may decide to repropose the
rules and solicit additional comments on those suggestions. '" 9°
The withdrawal notice was short on explanation, stating only
that "[a]fter further consideration of the proposed rule and the
comments on the proposal, the Department of the Interior de-
cided. . . that the proposed rule should be withdrawn for further
study." 9' Thus, after twelve years, three proposed definitions,
several court challenges, and much hand-wringing and posturing,
there was still no regulatory definition of VER.
E. The Present Situation
The lack of a judicially validated regulatory definition of
VER has not prevented OSM from acting as if one exists. Time
and again OSM has stated that it would apply the all permits
test, which it had initially proposed as the definition of VER,
along with the additional "good faith efforts" modification
suggested by the district court.
92
OSM's rationale for continuing to favor the good faith-all
permits test harkens back to Judge Flannery's decision ten years
ago. The agency apparently has felt compelled by the district
court's decision in PSMRL I to modify the all permits test to
incorporate the court's remand for inclusion of a good faith
19 Id. at 9,848.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 30,557.
91 In fact, OSM applies the good faith-all permits test only on Indian lands and
in federal program states, while tests promulgated by individual states are applied to
federal lands in state program states. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,954 (1986); 53 Fed. Reg. 52,375
(1988). To date, many if not all of the VER determinations made in the absence of a
federal definition have been made on federal lands in state program states. E.g., 55 Fed.
Reg. 1,288 (1990) (applying Ohio's all permits test); 54 Fed. Reg. 51,083 (1989) (applying
West Virginia's takings test). This practice creates a whole new set of legal issues,
because many state statutes and regulations were based on OSM's definitions of VER
that the courts later invalidated. See, e.g., Sunday Creek Coal Co. v. Hodel, NO. C-2-
88-0416, slip op. (S.D. Ohio June 2, 1988) (holding that even though applicant did not
have VER under Ohio "all permits" and "need and adjacent" tests, OSM's denial of
VER violated SMCRA and constituted compensible taking because it deprived applicant
of all economically feasible use of property interest).
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provision. 93 Neither case law nor the agency's own admissions,
however, support this position.
A court cannot modify an agency's regulation. In Federal
Power Commission v. Idaho Power Co.,94 for example, the
Federal Power Commission ("FPC") had issued an order au-
thorizing a hydroelectric project to go forward, subject to certain
restrictions. The court of appeals initially ordered the agency to
modify its order and remanded the action so it could make the
modification. After the FPC sought a clarification of the court's
decision, the court of appeals modified the agency's order itself
and then summarily affirmed the order as modified. The Su-
preme Court struck down the modification on the ground that
the court had "usurped an administrative function." 95 Noting
that "the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of
law is laid bare," the Court held that only the first appellate
court order, directing the agency to modify its action, was valid. 96
Judge Flannery had no power in the VER cases to modify
the all permits test promulgated by OSM, nor did he do so. His
only power, which he exercised, was to nullify the regulations
under the applicable standard of review. 97 The court's authority
ended when it remanded the all permits test. What OSM sub-
sequently treated as the court's "approval" merely reflected the
court's view that the all permits test could not survive judicial
scrutiny without at least containing a good faith provision. The
court did not rule out the possibility that the agency might adopt
some other test in the proper exercise of its administrative dis-
cretion.
Moreover, the Secretary of Interior himself has stated that
PSMRL I did not modify the all permits test. In challenging
91 E.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 51,548 (1980) (withdrawing 1979 rule and substituting good
faith-all permits test); 51 Fed. Reg. 41,954 (1986) (withdrawing takings test and substi-
tuting good faith-all permits test); 53 Fed. Reg. at 52,375 (1988) (proposing good faith-
all permits option).
' 344 U.S. 17 (1952).
91 Id. at 20.
Id. See also Burlington Northern, Inc. v. United States, 459 U.S. 131 (1982).
The Interstate Commerce Commission had, over a period of time, established three
different rates for rail shipment of coal. The court of appeals vacated the last two rates
and concluded that this had the effect of reviving the first rate. The Supreme Court
held that while the appellate court could invalidate a rate established by the ICC, it
could not then reinstate a previous rate, since it had expired when the second rate was
passed by the Commission. Id. at 143.
9 SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1).
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industry's right to appeal the decision in PSMRL I, the govern-
ment admitted that "[t]he district court unmistakably re-
manded" the regulation.9" As the Secretary correctly pointed
out, the definition of VER was remanded, not modified, by
PSMRL I. Acknowledging that remand, in fact, the Secretary
suspended the regulation."
An additional reason that OSM cannot use the good faith-
all permits test, as a matter of regulation and not policy, stems
from the method by which it has been imposed. Never has it
been set out for notice and comment and then adopted after
agency analysis of the comments, as required by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.'00 Not surprisingly, therefore, at least one
Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Interior has
already indicated that the 1986 suspension notice "reinstating"
the good faith-all permits test violated that Act's notice and
comment provisions. 101
III. GUIDEPOSTS FOR REGULATORY ACTION
A. The Language of the Act
The starting point for judicial review of regulatory action
under SMCRA, as with all administrative regulations, is the
language of the statute. 02 On its face, Section 522(e) is straight-
forward. It provides that "[aifter the enactment of this Act and
subject to valid existing rights no surface coal mining operations
except those which exist on the date of enactment of this Act
shall be permitted" on certain categories of lands. 03
The individual words in the phrase "valid existing rights"
seem clear enough. In normal parlance, we understand "valid"
to mean lawful, or having legal force. "Existing" quite evidently
means "in being" in this case on August 3, 1977 or at some
subsequent date when a particular prohibition took effect.
" Brief of the Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 1980) at 114.
" See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
'- See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). Indeed, the Secretary has promised that "[i]ndustry
will have the opportunity to comment upon and ultimately challenge whatever new test,
if any, the Secretary may promulgate." Brief of the Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 1980)
at 115.
1o, The Stearns Co., 110 I.B.L.A. 345, 354 (Burski, ALJ concurring).
102 See NWF v. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 764.
0I SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e).
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"Rights" is perhaps the most difficult component, but few
would argue that it describes that to which a person has a just
claim. Although it is an inherently broad term, one would un-
derstand from the Section 522(e) context that it referred to
property rights.°4 Certainly it is not otherwise limited.
Congress apparently was comfortable enough with the plain
meaning of the words that it felt no need to define them. Its
discussions in the legislative history confirm their reference to
property rights, however, for Congress said over and over again
that the very purpose of the VER exemption was to preserve
''property rights"' °5 and to avoid "paying compensation under
the Fifth Amendment."' 6 There are no contrary indications in
the words themselves or in the legislative history to suggest that
any other meaning was intended. On their face, then, the words
of exemption mean that the Section 522(e) prohibitions are to
apply only insofar as they do not disturb lawful property rights
that were in being when the prohibitions took effect. They
demonstrate that Congress was prepared to and did make ac-
commodations in the legislative plan for environmental protec-
tion in recognition of the need to preserve and protect other
important interests.
The balanced view routinely ignored by those who see in
SMCRA only the protection of the environment, to the exclusion
of all other interests, is confirmed by accommodations that
Congress made throughout the Act and elsewhere in the prohi-
bitions themselves. In addition to protecting property rights, for
instance, Congress clearly and repeatedly weighed its approach
to environmental protection against the Nation's crucial energy
needs. To meet those needs, Congress found it essential to make
legislative compromises "to insure the existence of an expanding
and economically healthy underground coal mining industry." 0 7
Indeed, one of the express purposes of SMCRA is to: "[A]ssure
that the coal supply essential to the Nation's energy require-
ments, and to its economic and social well-being is provided and
strike a balance between protection of the environment and
,o So natural is this reading that the D.C. Circuit inadvertently referred to "valid
property rights," instead of "valid existing rights," in its decision on continually created
VER. NWF v. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 750.
05 E.g., 121 CONG. REC. H6,679 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Udall).
123 CONG. REC. H12,787 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Udall). For a fuller discussion
of the legislative history, see infra notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
,o7 SMCRA § 101(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1988).
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agricultural productivity and the Nation's need for coal as an
essential source of energy . . . ."08
Several components of Section 522(e) itself reflect this con-
scious and continued accommodation of interests. To begin with,
the opening language contains not one but two exceptions to the
prohibitions: an exception for "surface coal mining operations
... which exist on the date of enactment of this Act," and the
VER exemption itself. Under general norms of statutory con-
struction, Congress' inclusion of both exceptions cautions against
any interpretation that would equate the two by limiting VER
to mining operations that actually existed on August 3, 1977.10 9
In addition to these exceptions, Congress repeatedly put
limitations on the prohibitions themselves. For instance, it pro-
vided for government agency waivers of the prohibitions against
mining within a national forest and mining that affects historic
sites. 1" 0 The buffer zones around roads are subject to avoidance
or modification in several ways."' Also the protection accorded
occupied dwellings is waivable by the owner of the dwelling.
1 12
The language of the statute clearly identifies the legislative
result, the regulatory accommodation of competing environmen-
tal interests and other important interests, with which any defi-
nition of "valid existing rights" must harmonize. The need to
reach this result, and thus to achieve essential consistency with
the Act's grant of legislative authority,"3 necessarily influences
-o SMCRA § 102(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(0 (1988).
,0 See 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed.
1984) (if possible, each word of a statute must be given effect).
110 The Secretary of the Interior can permit mining on lands within national forest
boundaries if he finds there are no significant recreational, timber, economic, or other
values incompatible with surface mining operations and either (1) the surface operations
are incident to an underground mine, or (2) the Secretary of Agriculture determines,
with respect to certain areas, that the surface mining complies with SMCRA and other
designated statutes. SMCRA § 522(e)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2) (1988). Exceptions to
the historic sites prohibition are available with the joint approval of the regulatory
authority and the agency with jurisdiction over the site. SMCRA § 522(e)(3), 30 U.S.C.
§ 1272(e)(3) (1988).
"I An outright exception exists if mine access roads or haulage roads join the right-
of-way line of the protected area. Further, the regulatory authority may permit affected
roads to be relocated and may allow mining within the 100-foot buffer zone if the
interests of the public and affected landowners will be protected. SMCRA § 522(e)(4),
30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(4) (1988).
22 SMCRA § 522(e)(5), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(5) (1988).
"3 The Act's standard of judicial review requires affirmance of the regulations
unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law." SMCRA §
526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1988).
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the assessment of the other traditional guideposts for regulatory
action.
B. The Historical Use And Meaning Of "Valid Existing Rights"
1. Other Statutes
The past usage of a term is a valid guide to its present
meaning." 4 Past usage is particularly crucial to interpreting Sec-
tion 522(e), which, unlike other provisions of SMCRA, was self-
executing and effective on the day it was enacted. Moreover,
since this past usage of the term also reflects its ordinary mean-
ing, there is a strong inference that Congress intended the or-
dinary meaning to apply, not a hedged and qualified meaning
developed by a regulatory agency attempting to restrike the
balance of interests Congress already set in the statute."'
The concept of valid existing rights is not unique to SMCRA,
nor is it a doctrine of recent vintage. It dates back to the Mining
Law of 1872, in which Congress opened federal lands to mineral
development but disclaimed any impairments of "rights or in-
terests in mining property acquired under existing laws."11 6 Since
then, VER has become a staple of federal land legislation. Con-
gress has used it as a shorthand to create exemptions in such
diverse statutes as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 117
the Alaska Railroad Transfer Act of 1982,"1 the Revised Organic
Act of the Virgin Islands," 9 the Territorial Submerged Lands
Act of 1974,120 and numerous provisions concerning the resto-
- Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 404 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
" United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985); Richards v. United States, 363 U.S.
1, 9 (1962).
36 Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 16, 17 Stat. 96 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 47
(1988)).
"I Pub. L. 92-203, § 14(g), 85 Stat. 702 (1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1613(g)
(1988)).
"I Pub. L. 97-456, §§ 603(3), 613(e), 96 Stat. 2556, 2577 (1983) (codified at 45
U.S.C. §§ 1202(3), 1212(e) (1988)).
Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, § 31 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1545 (1982)).
Pub. L. 93-435, § l(a), 88 Stat. 1210 (1974) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1705(a)
(1982)).
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ration of land to Indian tribal ownership, 12' as well as in the
federal government's most comprehensive land management stat-
ute, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
("FLPMA").122 The term is used repeatedly throughout title 16
of the United States Code as a limitation on the authority of
the Secretary of the Interior to acquire and oversee land for
national parks, monuments, seashores, and forests.12  All these
provisions share the common goal of preserving property rights
obtained under prior law from destruction upon the enactment
of a new statutory scheme that would otherwise impair or erad-
icate them, much as the unsuitability provisions of SMCRA
would otherwise impair or eradicate such rights absent the VER
exemption.
Title 16's national parks and related provisions highlight an
important feature of VER: that the VER inquiry usually pre-
cedes, and is independent of, whatever regulatory restrictions
the agency may impose on the exercise of the existing rights.
The 1980 statute creating the Steese National Conservation Area
is typical. 24 First, it states that the Interior Secretary's admin-
istration of the area is "[s]ubject to valid existing rights."' 25
Then, again subject to VER, it withdraws the minerals within
the area from location, entry, and patent under federal mining
laws. 126 Finally, with yet another reference to VER, it provides
that all mining claims within the area shall be subject to such
reasonable regulations as the Secretary may prescribe to assure
that the mining will be consistent with the protected values of
121 See, e.g., pertaining to various Indian Tribes, 25 U.S.C. §§ 463(a), 566d, 575,
621, 766(a), 903d(b), (c),. 1300i-l(c)(2) (1988)). These provisions typically transfer land
to the Secretary of the Interior to be held in trust for a tribe, "subject to all valid
existing rights including liens, outstanding taxes (local and State), and mortgages." Id.
at § 566d.
2 Pub. L. 94-579, § 701(h), 90 Stat. 2786 (1976) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701
note (1988)) ("All actions by the Secretary concerned under this Act shall be subject to
valid existing rights").
2 See, from various acts pertaining to National Parkways, 16 U.S.C. §§ 47e, 80a,
90, 90a, 90a-l, 90c-1, 90e, 90e-1, l10c, lllc, 123, 228b, 251n, 271, 272, 273, 350, 350a,
398c, 403-3, 403k-1, 405, 406d-1, 408e, 410bb, 410hh-2, 410hh-5, 410ii, 410mm-I, 431,
447, 450y, 450y-2, 450z, 450oo, 460q, 460q-5, 460u-5, 460v, 460v-4, 460y-5, 460z, 460z-
8, 460aa-9, 460dd-2, 460gg-8, 46011-1, 460mm-l, 460mm-2, 460mm-4, 460nn-3, 460oo,
460qq, 460rr-2, 460uu-32, 460uu-46, 460vv-3, 460xx-l, 460yy-l, 539, 539a, 539g (1988).
- Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILC Act), Pub. L. 96-
487, § 403, 94 Stat. 2371, 2396 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460mm-I (1988)).
121 ANILC Act § 402(a), 16 U.S.C. § 460mm-l(a) (1988).
1 ANILC Act § 402(b), 16 U.S.C. § 460mm-l(b) (1988).
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the area. 127 The regulations merely follow VER, they do not
determine it-a point underscored by the remainder of the stat-
ute, which enables even holders of unperfected mining claims to
avoid the withdrawal of the area from further mining.12 8 The
relevant inquiry is simply whether the claimant has taken steps
to maintain the claim as a matter of property law, not whether
he has applied for (let alone obtained) the myriad regulatory
permits he may later need to commence mining.
129
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA") is
also instructive. It authorizes the withdrawal of certain public
lands by the Secretary of the Interior, subject to VER. 130 It
further provides, however, that holders of prior patents shall be
protected if their occupancy has been maintained "in accordance
with appropriate public land law,"' 3 ' and that claimants asserting
prior valid mining claims are protected in their possessory rights
if they comply with all requirements of the general mining laws.1
3 2
The provision suggests that when Congress intended to limit
VER by requiring compliance with other laws, it so stated. There
is no such limiting language in Section 522(e) of SMCRA.
One more statutory guidepost is significant. Two years before
SMCRA, Congress included a VER exception in the Federal
Coal Leasing Amendments Act.'33 That Act sought to diminish
the concentration of coal leaseholds among a small number of
companies by mechanisms such as eliminating the existing system
of exclusive prospecting rights and preferential rights to lease,
27 ANILC Act § 402(c), 16 U.S.C. § 460mm-l(c) (1988). The severance of VER
from the regulatory determinations occurs in both pre-SMCRA and post-SMCRA pro-
visions. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 90-540, § 5, 82 Stat. 904 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 460v-4 (1988), establishing Flaming Gorge National Recreation Area) and Pub. L. No.
92-593, § 3, 86 Stat. 1312 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460dd-2, relating to the Glen
Canyon National Recreation Area), both pre-SMCRA, and the Pennsylvania Wilderness
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-585 § 6(c), 98 Stat. 3101 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460qq(c)
(1988)) and the ANILC Act § 502, 16 U.S.C. § 539a (1988), both post-SMCRA.
1 ANILC Act § 404, 16 U.S.C. § 460mm-3 (1988).
19 See ANILC Act § 404(b), 16 U.S.C. § 460mm-3(b) (1988).
1 Pub. L. No. 92-203, § 14(g), 85 Stat. 702 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1613(g)
(1982)) (ANCSA).
'31 ANCSA § 22(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (1982).
"2 ANCSA § 22(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1621(c) (1982). See Alaska Miners v. Andrus, 662
F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1981) (no valid existing right to patent exists outside time
restrictions of § 1621(c)).
,31 Pub. L. 94-377, § 4, 90 Stat. 1085 (1976) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201 note)
(amending, subject to valid existing rights, section 2(b) of the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988)).
1989-90]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
and substituting instead a system of nonexclusive exploratory
licenses.'3 4 Congress used the VER exception to stress that the
amendments were "not intended to affect any valid prospecting
permit outstanding at the time of enactment of the amend-
ments.' ' 35 The Secretary of the Interior recognized that by rea-
son of VER, holders of outstanding prospecting permits were
not bound by the new statutory restrictions, but instead contin-
ued to be subject to the superseded permit system despite Con-
gress' express dissatisfaction with many aspects of that system.,
3 6
The ease with which the Secretary interpreted the plain language
of this VER exemption to preserve operators' existing rights in
the face of the statute's arguably countervailing policies makes
all the more puzzling his failure for the past thirteen years to
define with equal candor the identically worded exemption in
Section 522(e) of SMCRA.
2. Judicial and Administrative Interpretations
Courts and administrative bodies regularly emphasize the
broad scope of the statutory VER exemptions, which express
"recognition that established property rights are to be deferred
to.' 31 7 The deference entails not only recognizing the presence
of VER, but also interpreting other provisions of the statute
consistently with the congressionally mandated exemption.'
Courts determining VER often must also consider the extent
to whici the applicant has perfected his property rights and
otherwise assumed their validity. Over 80 years ago, in East
Central Eureka Mining v. Central Eureka Mining Co., Justice
Holmes wrote:
The provision that the act shall not impair existing rights is,
perhaps, some indication that it extends to inchoate rights
11 See H.R. REP. No. 681, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 22-23 (1975).
" S. REP. No. 296, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975).
-- 43 C.F.R. § 3430.0-7 (1988). See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Congress criticized the permit system for
encouraging speculation rather than mineral development, concentrating leases in a few
large operators, depriving the public of a fair return for its coal resources, failing to
control environmental effects, and imposing onerous restrictions on the return of monies
to the states from the sale of federal leases within their borders. H.R. REp. No. 681,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-20 (1975).
137 Henry H. Wilson, 35 I.B.L.A. 349, 352 (1978).
I See East Central Eureka Mining Co. v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 204 U.S.
266, 270 (1907)(Holmes, J.)(harmonizing existing rights exemption of Mining Law of
1872 with other provisions of that Act).
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which constitutionally it might have impaired. At all events it
should be taken in a liberal sense .... We believe that Con-
gress used the word in a somewhat popular sense, . . .without
considering what injustice might be within its constitutional
power to commit.3 9
Later cases have reiterated that time-honored view. In a case
under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act,' 40 the D.C. Circuit rec-
ognized that the VER exception was intended to protect the
rights of existing lessees, although it could not exempt from the
statute a lease applicant whose application was merely pending
at the time of statutory enactment.' 4' Similarly, a decision under
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA") makes
clear that VER does not necessarily mean vested rights, present
possessory rights, or even a future interest that becomes posses-
sory upon the expiration of earlier estates. 14 2 Even though rights
of a municipality in that case would not have vested until the
municipality sought and obtained approval of a subdivisional
survey of the property, they were VER for purposes of protecting
the property from conveyance to Alaskan native corporations
under the ANCSA.1
43
If an applicant need not possess vested property rights in
order to have VER, common sense dictates that VER should
also protect an applicant who does possess a vested property
right but has yet to take other steps necessary to utilize it in the
manner he plans. Under SMCRA, a mining operator's ownership
of mineral rights may have been perfected long before he intends
to commence mining; these cases say that is enough to give him
VER even though he may not have obtained the permits neces-
sary to begin operations.
A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit under the Territorial Submerged Lands Act,
which contains a VER provision, confirms this view.' 44 The
119 204 U.S. at 270-71. To like effect, see Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532,
544 (1923) (statutory exemption for "existing valid claims" means "something less than
a vested right, ... since such a right would require no exception to insure its preser-
vation").
110 Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 443 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226 (1988)).
1' Miller v. Udall, 317 F.2d 573, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
,,1 Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. United States, 806 F.2d 924, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1986).
143 Id.
I" West Indian Co., Ltd. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 109 S.Ct. 31 (1988).
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proponent of VER asserted a claim dating from 1913 to certain
submerged harbor lands. Following early development of a small
portion of the parcel in 1914, the rest of the land remained
submerged and undeveloped for over fifty years, until the gov-
ernment sought to quiet title over it and the owner proposed
dredging and other development. 145 Litigation and a series of
agreements followed, with the owner settling for thirty of the
original forty-two acres. Later, when a public outcry arose over
the dredging, opponents argued that the Territorial Submerged
Lands Act conveyed all submerged lands (including the thirty
acres) to the Virgin Islands in trust, and that the Virgin Islands
had no authority to convey the land out of trust.
The court upheld the owner's assertion of VER, even though
the owner at the time of enactment of the VER provision had
not applied for the permits he would eventually need in order
to dredge and fill the land.146 The decision implicitly recognizes
that the focus of the VER inquiry is on the existence of property
rights, not on the satisfaction of regulatory constraints on in-
tended property use. 147 It also reflects the realities of doing
business in a heavily regulated industry that is tied to interests
in land. For entirely legitimate business reasons, a company may
acquire the land long before developing it. While the company
might be deemed to bear the risk of future regulatory constraints
on development, the very purpose of the VER exemption is to
protect the company against regulation that is so vigorous as to
foreclose any use of the property rights.
3. Public Lands v. Private Lands
Many, but certainly not all, of the statutes recognizing VER
concern interests in public property rather than private property.
The VER provision of SMCRA concerns both: it extends not
only to rights in public lands such as national parks and forests,
but also to rights to mine on private lands. Those who urge a
narrow exemption advance the argument that the historical
Id. at 1009-10.
See Id. at 1011 and n.4.




meaning of VER under public lands statutes is therefore irrele-
vant to the interpretation of VER under SMCRA.1
48
The argument suffers from a serious lack of logical appeal.
As we have seen, the statutes dealing exclusively with public
lands embrace a broad definition of VER to preserve existing
property interests. 49 Courts not only have construed these VER
exemptions broadly, but have prevented the administrative agen-
cies from circumventing them by imposing harsh regulations that
would effectively nullify the protected rights. 50 If VER thus
creates broad protections as to public lands, it should apply with
all the more force to purely private lands, where the government
has at most a regulatory interest, not a proprietary one.
Moreover, the argument disregards the fact that the VER
provision of SMCRA draws no distinction based on public or
private ownership of the land. 5' The statutory silence is signif-
icant because elsewhere in SMCRA, Congress expressly differ-
entiated between public and private lands, creating separate
program implementation and permit application requirements
for them.5 2 Under general norms of statutory interpretation,'
the absence of the distinction in the VER provision of Section
522(e) reflects Congress' intention that no such distinction be
drawn.
Finally, it is noteworthy that Congress enacted a comprehen-
sive and expansive public lands statute, FLPMA, only one year
before SMCRA. As we have seen, 154 it provided a VER exemp-
tion in that statute. It is inconceivable that Congress could
contemporaneously have included the exact same provision in
141 OSM used this distinction, on one occasion, to justify ignoring the entire body
of pre-SMCRA statutory and case law. In the preamble to the 1979 definition of VER,
the all permits test which effectively swallowed the exemption, OSM explained that the
case law under other statutes was irrelevant because SMCRA: "changed the context of
VER significantly .... OSM therefore believes that the definition of VER should take
into account both the new regulatory framework created by the Act and the fact that
the Act applies VER to both private and Federal lands." 44 Fed. Reg. 14,993 (1979).
141 See, e.g., the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act, supra notes 122, 133.
See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
'' Section 522 identifies both types of property interests and incorporates them all
under a single umbrella VER provision. See SMCRA § 522, 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (1988).
52 See SMCRA §§ 523, 715, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1273, 1305. The Secretary of the Interior
devotes an entire subchapter of the regulations to surface coal mining and reclamation
on federal lands. 30 C.F.R. Subchapter D.
13 See NWF v. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 760 n. 105.
' See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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SMCRA and intended it to have a different meaning without so
much as a whimper of that intent in the legislative history.
C. The Constitutional Prohibition Against "Takings"
One goal of VER exemptions is to prevent "takings" of
private property for public use and thus avoid the attendant
constitutional obligation to pay "just compensation" for it.'
The legislative history of SMCRA demonstrates that Congress
intended the VER exemption to encompass the rights protected
by the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment, and then some.
The Secretary's interpretation should follow suit not only in the
interest of accurately implementing the legislative intent, but also
to comport with the principle that statutes should be construed
and applied in a manner that will avoid constitutional prob-
lems. 156
1. Major Supreme Court Taking Cases
It has often been said that there is no set formula for
determining when a taking has occurred.' 57 Nevertheless, an ex-
amination of several Supreme Court taking cases shows not only
that the all permits test first promulgated by the agency would
create large numbers of takings for which compensation would
have to be paid, but also that the good faith-all permits test
currently in use creates the same result.
The most germane cases in this area are Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon 5 8 and its progeny. There the plaintiff owned the
surface rights of the land at issue. Prior to the state legislature's
passage of restrictions on mining, he had granted the defendant
coal company the right to remove the underlying coal and waived
all damages that might have been caused by the mining. Follow-
ing the conveyance, Pennsylvania enacted a statute prohibiting
coal mining that would result in the subsidence of land under
certain occupied dwellings. 59 The parties agreed that the statute
... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
-56 See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); United States v. Thompson,
452 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 (1972).
"I E.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
1" 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
159 The Pennsylvania statute was similar to § 522(e)(5) of the Act, which prevents
mining, subject to VER, within 300 feet of occupied dwellings.
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"destroy[ed] previously existing rights," and the coal company
claimed that the destruction of rights was unconstitutional.
160
The Court concluded that the company could not mine the coal,
because the statute made it economically impractical, and held
that the statute constituted a taking.' 6' Justice Holmes explained:
It is our opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an exercise
of the police power, so far as it affects the mining of coal
under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such
coal has been reserved .... What makes the right to mine
coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To make
it commercially impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly
the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or
destroying it. 162
Sixty-five years later, the Court revisited Pennsylvania min-
ing law in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De Bene-
dictis, 63 which involved the constitutionality of a 1966 state law
regulating mine subsidence.16' The implementing regulations re-
quired that 50 percent of coal beneath protected structures be
left in place to provide surface support. Relying on Mahon, the
plaintiff coal association alleged that the statute violated the
takings clause. 65 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the
differences between the two cases were far more significant than
the similarities.166
After characterizing Justice Holmes' discussion of the earlier
statute's constitutionality as an "advisory opinion,"' 67 the Court
distinguished the instant suit because (1) the regulation of sub-
sidence here represented the state's legitimate interest in com-
batting a "significant threat to the common welfare," and (2)
there was no evidence that the requirement to leave 50 percent
of the coal in place made it impossible for the coal companies
to engage in their business profitably. 68 Thus, for purposes of
determining "takings," Keystone reflects use of a balancing test
1 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
,61 Id. at 414-5.
162 Id. (citation omitted).
, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 Pa.
Stat. Ann. § 1406.1 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
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in which the extent of the regulatory impairment is weighed
against the public interest advanced by the regulation. While not
ruling out the possibility that onerous regulation of mining can
amount to a taking, or that application of the statute in question
in given circumstances might constitute a taking, Keystone ap-
pears to signal a high degree of deference to the public interest
judgments of state legislatures and regulatory agencies.
169
Outside the mining context, the leading case on regulatory
takings is Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
("Penn Central").170 In Penn Central the company attempted to
gain approval for construction of an office building above Grand
Central Terminal. Changes to the terminal were restricted pur-
suant to the city's Landmarks Preservation Law and, as a result,
the company's requests for the necessary permit was denied. The
company brought suit on the ground that this effected a taking.
The Court disagreed. Balancing the character of the regulatory
action with the nature and extent of the interference with existing
property rights, the Court found that the city had a legitimate
interest in regulating landmarks, that the regulation was sub-
stantially related to that interest, and that the regulation did not
deprive the company of all use of its pre-existing air rights,
which could be transferred to other parcels it owned in the
city.1 
71
Several factors distinguish Penn Central from the typical
SMCRA takings scenario. The New York zoning ordinance did
not interfere with the present use of the building as a railroad
terminal and office and retail space. The company was able to
obtain a reasonable return on its investment. Furthermore, use
of the company's air rights was not absolutely forbidden. 172 For
these reasons, the Court concluded that the facts before it did
10 Some who favor the narrowest possible VER exemption would avoid takings as
a meaningful or necessary guide to VER regulation, finding in Keystone and other cases
an argument that mining fits within the "nuisance" exception to the takings doctrine.
They argue, therefore, that takings is not a relevant issue in the consideration of VER
regulation under SMCRA. The short answer is plain: if that were true, why did Congress
seek to encourage and support mining in enacting SMCRA? See SMCRA §§ 101(b),
102(0, (k), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201(b), 1202(0, (k). If that were true, why did Congress so
expressly include the VER exemption for the purpose of avoiding takings and paying
compensation under the Fifth Amendment? See discussion of legislative history infra at
notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
1- 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
171 Id. at 136-38.
72 Id. at 136.
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not warrant the finding, under Mahon, that the law was so
restrictive of property rights that it created a taking.
In contrast, if a highly restrictive definition of VER is prom-
ulgated, SMCRA dictates that with narrow exceptions, mining
is absolutely prohibited. In such cases, takings would likely
occur, contrary to the legislative intent. Operators that own only
the right to mine, and not the surface rights, clearly would lose
all their economic interests by reason of government regulation.
Moreover, even where the mining company owned both surface
and mineral rights, it might still receive no other reasonable
return on its investment if the topography. of the land or its
location were such that it had no viable economic use except for
mining.
The Supreme Court recently confirmed that deference to
government's public interest judgments is not absolute, and that
a regulation can be so onerous as to effect a taking. In First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles,173 a county ordinance prohibited the reconstruction
of any building in an area that was subject to periodic flooding.
The ordinance barred the reconstruction of several of plaintiff's
church buildings that had been destroyed in a previous flood.
Quoting Mahon, the Court reaffirmed the general rule that
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. ''74 The Court
held that the ordinance amounted to a taking of the church's
property in the flood area because it deprived the church of all
use of the property, which had been a retreat center and recre-
ational area for handicapped children prior to being destroyed
by the flood.
2. Taking Cases Under SMCRA
A body of law on takings under SMCRA is beginning to
emerge, with two courts recently holding that certain applications
of SMCRA and OSM's regulations created compensible takings.
In Sunday Creek Coal Co. v. Hodel,171 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled that denial
of VER had effected a taking. In 1941, the company had sold
173 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
114 Id. at 316.
"I No. C-2-88-0416, slip op. (S.D. Ohio June 2, 1988).
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the land in question but reserved the mineral rights. The surface
rights were eventually conveyed to the United States, which
incorporated the land in a national forest. 76 As a result, once
SMCRA was passed the land became subject to the prohibition
on mining in Section 522(e)(2). The company's request for a
finding of VER was denied on the ground that the land did not
meet either the all permits test or the necessary for and adjacent
to test under Ohio law.' 77 Almost any VER application in 1988
would be denied under those tests, the court found, because it
"would have been unfeasible for any company to have applied
for permits in 1977 and then have waited until 1988 to begin
mining.' ' 78 The court held that the use of those tests would
eliminate the only economic benefit that the company could
obtain from its property, contrary to both congressional policy
under SMCRA and the constitutional prohibition against takings
without just compensation.1
79
The second, and more widely known, takings case under
SMCRA did not involve Section 522. In Whitney Benefits, Inc.
v. United States, 80 the U.S. Claims Court awarded more than
$60 million to the plaintiff, plus interest and attorneys' fees,
after finding that the enactment of SMCRA had created a taking
of plaintiff's coal rights.' 8' Mining on the plaintiff's land had
been barred under Section 510(b)(5)(A) of SMCRA, which pro-
hibits surface mining that would interfere with farming on al-
luvial valley floors.8 2
After a close examination of the facts, the Whitney court
ruled that "SMCRA effectively denied plaintiffs all economically
viable use of their coal property."" 3 Specifically, the court agreed
with the plaintiff's contention that the prohibition interfered
with its investment-backed expectations prior to the enactment
of SMCRA. The court noted that while the plaintiff's rights in
the property were technically not confined to surface mining,
176 Id., slip op. at 1-2.
"I Id. at 3. OSM used the state definition of VER, which in turn was based on
the since-rejected definitions OSM promulgated in 1979. Id.
"I Id. at 4.
,71 Id. at 7-8.
" 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (Cl. Ct. 1989).
,s Whitney thus presents another problem for those who claim that mining is a
"nuisance" and that takings can therefore not occur under SMCRA.
SMCRA § 510(b)(5)(A), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5)(A).
, 18 Cl. Ct. at 405.
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the other uses alleged by the United States were illusory: under-
ground mining at the site, which SMCRA did not ban, was
economically and technologically unfeasible; plaintiffs held rights
to mine other minerals besides coal, but there were no other
minerals of value on the property; and it was irrelevant that the
plaintiffs had a right to farm and ranch the surface property,
because what plaintiffs sought to remedy was the loss of their
coal rights.l8
These cases point out the fundamental flaw in any VER
definition based upon seeking or obtaining all permits by the
date of SMCRA's enactment. Such definitions fail to take ac-
count of the fact that the acquisition of property rights and the
commencement of mining operations are usually two separate
and noncontemporaneous transactions. The cases come to grips
with that reality, and also with the reality that the impairment
of a property owner's specifically intended use of the property,
i.e., for surface coal mining, is remediable even though it does
not literally deprive him of all use of the land.
D. The Legislative History
The legislative history of SMCRA clearly demonstrates that
Congress included the concept of VER to avoid takings for
which compensation would have to be paid. During the House
debate on the bill, Representative Roncalio offered an amend-
ment that would have deleted the VER provision.'85 He recog-
nized that without the VER exemption the Act would effect
takings for which compensation would have to be paid.'" The
manager of the bill in the House, Representative Udall, opposed
the change because without VER, the Act would not preserve
rights whose impairment required compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. 18 7 The amendment was rejected and the phrase was
retained.
This colloquy reflects the "strongly held congressional pur-
pose to limit the costs associated with the implementation of the
Act by avoiding inverse condemnation of private rights that
I8 /d.
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would require the payment of just compensation."'' 88 The con-
gressional intent to avoid takings has also been acknowledged
by the Supreme Court' 89 and by other federal courts construing
SMCRA. 19
The Secretary has concurred in this interpretation of the
legislative history in his statements during rulemaking, even from
the start of the ill-fated all permits test.' 91 OSM more recently
recognized this intent when it promulgated the takings test.
92
While Congress intended that valid existing rights prevent
takings under SMCRA, it went even further, a fact that OSM
has yet to acknowledge. By using the phrase "valid existing
rights," Congress selected a term of art that has appeared in
statutes for more than a century, and stands for the broad
preservation of existing property rights. 93 The legislative history
of SMCRA gives no indication that Congress intended the term
to mean anything different from what it meant previously. Thus,
for instance, the Committee Reports do not discuss VER solely
in terms of takings. 94 And thus, for another instance, the sep-
arate comments of then Representative Manuel Lujan recognize
in VER a broad protector of existing property rights:
[T]he bill's language .. . is not intended to preclude mining
where the owner of the mineral has the legal right to extract
the coal by surface mining method.
I believe, therefore, that it would be contrary to the intention
of the Act, and a misuse of the Act, . . . [to] argue that [the
Act] somehow modifies the relationship between the owner of
the surface and subsurface rights. Clearly, alienation by sale,
assignment, gift, or inheritance of the property right of the
coal is not affected by the Act nor is the legal right to mine
S Meridian Land and Mineral Co. v. Hodel, 843 F.2d 340, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1988).
119 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 296 n.37.
190 See, e.g., NWF v. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 750 ("Congress did not intend to ...
effect takings through § 522(e)"); Ainsley v. United States, 8 Ct. Cl. 394, 401 (1985)
(there is a 'virtual statutory command' from Congress that defendant avoid takings as
a result of the Surface Mining Act"); PSMRL II, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1562-
63 n. 6 (recognizing "Congress' wishes to avoid any takings").
44 Fed. Reg. at 14,992 (1979).
48 Fed. Reg. at 41,313 (1983).
"9' See supra notes 116-36 and accompanying text.
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, reprinted at 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. ADh". NEws 593, 631; S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 94-95 (1977).
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the coal in any way modified if such right existed prior to
enactment of the Act.
195
Since Congress has had many opportunities to use the term
"valid existing rights," the most reasonable conclusion, in lieu
of any evidence to the contrary, is that no difference was in-
tended between SMCRA and previous legislation.'9
In short, the legislative history demonstrates that the Act
was not intended to foster regulations that would impose new
obligations before landowners could exercise their pre-existing
rights. The Senate was clear that "all valid existing property
rights must be preserved," and that it had "no intention what-
soever, by any provision of this bill, to change such rights.
'1 97
In fact, as the D.C. Circuit has held, "throughout the SMCRA,
Congress expressed a concern for preserving existing property
rights, and for not interfering with state determination of those
rights."' 9 In contravention of this clear intent, both the all
permits test and the good faith all permits test would eliminate
existing property rights if operators did not take a separate step
having to do with the regulation of those rights but not with the
rights themselves.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY CHOICES
Against the background of the regulatory history of VER,
and the constraints and interpretive guides that of necessity
channel its definition, we now turn to an analysis of the indi-
vidual regulatory choices. We will begin by considering a case-
by-case approach to VER determinations. We will then discuss
each of the "fixed" options, proceeding from the most narrow
exemption (the modified all permits test) to the most broad (the
ownership test).
A. Case-by-Case VER Determinations
The essence of this approach is that it would provide flexi-
bility and would involve a balancing of the factors involved. It
191 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 189 (1977) (separate views of Rep.
Lujan).
" See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972); Sea-Land Service,
Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 404 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977).
NWF v. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 757.
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could be more or less formal, proceeding with no regulation at
all or a reasonably detailed regulation. It would seem to make
sense, however, that this approach be coupled with a regulation
that at least generally described the process to be followed and
identified the factors to be balanced by the regulatory authorities
in making VER determinations. Additional levels of detail could
be added, of course, such as an indication of the ranges of
weight to be accorded each factor.
From the standpoint of a regulator, there would appear to
be a number of attractions to this approach. Depending upon
the level of detail involved in any accompanying regulation, a
case-by-case approach would provide the flexibility to assess the
individual circumstances and to "work around" the statutory
constraints. It would enable the regulatory authority to consider,
in specific terms, the environmental interest sought to be pro-
tected, which may range anywhere from Yosemite National Park
to a seldom-used county road. It would enable the regulatory
authority to consider the specific property rights at stake, in-
cluding the clarity of the conveyancing documents and the size
of the investment involved. It would enable the regulatory au-
thority to assess the probable political fallout from any decision
he might make, and the strength of any takings challenge that
might be filed if VER were denied. And, again depending on
the level of detail involved in any accompanying regulation, it
may well assist the Secretary in getting past the initial judicial
review hurdle.
But there are also clear downsides to this approach. Although
it would provide flexibility, the fact is that there are statutory
constraints. A case-by-case approach would permit the regula-
tory authority to grant a broader exemption, perhaps, where the
environmental interests to be protected affect only a few, and
to narrow the exemption where the interests to be protected are
for the benefit of the many. In other words, the regulatory
authority could effectively apply a double standard: VER would
mean one thing under Sections 522(e)(1) and (2), and something
else under Sections 522(e)(4) and (5). But the problem with this
is that Congress made no such differentiation. It provided a
single VER exemption for all of Section 522(e), with no indica-
tion that it was to be applied differently to the different pro-
tected categories.
This fundamental legal defect in the case-by-case approach
could be more or less remedied by the degree of detail provided
[VOL. 5:693
REGULATORY CHOICES
in an accompanying regulation. Each added detail would have
the benefit of reducing the potential defect, perhaps ultimately
bringing it within a range of latitude that a reviewing court
would find acceptable. The negative corollary, of course, is that
each added detail would increase the likelihood that the regula-
tion would be challenged in the first place.
A case-by-case approach presents other problems as well. It
does not deliver the certainty, predictability or consistency that
a regulation should provide. It does not provide a set of mean-
ingful standards for the regulatory authority to apply, and to
fall back on when his or her decision is challenged. As a result,
it subjects the regulatory authority to considerable pressure be-
fore the decision is made and to considerable second-guessing
after it is made. Once again, of course, each of these problems
will occur in greater or lesser degree according to the level of
detail included in any guiding regulation.
In short, the dilemma presented by the case-by-case approach
is this: the more the regulator takes advantage of the flexibility
that he or she wants in making VER determinations, the more
he or she is subject to legitimate charges of not applying the law
evenly. Maximum flexibility would probably mean that almost
every VER determination would be judicially reviewed, a clearly
unsatisfactory result for all concerned. Constraining the flexibil-
ity by sufficient regulation to avoid that problem and to survive
judicial review of the regulation itself, on the other hand, would
eliminate most or all of the attraction to this approach.
On balance, we believe that the negatives of this approach
outweigh its benefits. In order to comply with SMCRA and to
provide a much-needed predictability and consistency, the Sec-
retary should opt for a "fixed" definition of VER.
B. The Modified All Permits Test
The arguments favoring this approach are that it is easy to
use and produces consistent results. There is no doubt that this
is true. But these benefits are overcome by the host of problems
that this test would cause if it were adopted as the regulatory
definition of VER. 199
I" The Secretary has repeatedly said that an all permits test, or some variant
thereof, would not be an exclusive test but would simply be one way to establish VER.
See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. While statements of that kind offer
something of a life preserver in a reviewing court, they render the test meaningless
absent something more which indicates how else VER may be established.
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First, administrative convenience is desirable, but it is easily
the most dispensable of the objectives for a VER regulation.
Many courts and many cases have held that administrative con-
venience is insufficient to justify a regulation. 200 Only recently,
in fact, in a case involving other issues under SMCRA, Judge
Flannery-who has decided more SMCRA cases than any other
federal judge-observed: "[T]he Secretary's argument boils down
to: difficulty in enforcing the law is a good reason not to. Such
a view ill becomes the Executive Branch, and it is not one that
the Judicial Branch may adopt." 20'
More fundamentally, the modified all permits test is an
irrational approach to achieving the statutory purpose. Perhaps
because it fundamentally misunderstands the business of mining,
it has virtually nothing to do with protecting the "valid existing
rights" that the exemption was crafted to preserve. It is remi-
niscent of the old story about the man who was combing the
sidewalk under a street light to find a quarter he had lost. A
stranger, trying to be helpful, asked where he had lost it. When
the man pointed to a spot about twenty feet away, the confused
stranger asked why he was not looking for it there. "Because
the light's better here," the man answered.
Mining companies make relatively long-term decisions in-
volving large investments. Permits are regulatory approvals of
relatively short duration, 20 2 and they are obtained when actual
mining operations are to commence. Amassing the coal proper-
ties that will someday be a mine is a complicated and time-
consuming process. It can and typically does involve a great
many transactions, including acquiring contiguous blocks of coal,
obtaining necessary consents, and arranging to finance the ac-
quisitions. The decision to commence actual mining operations,
however, involves a different set of considerations, notably in-
cluding the existence of markets for the coal and the cost of
capital. The investment involved in opening a mine is substantial,
and is not prudently undertaken without a hard-headed business
decision that the timing is right and that the operations will
recover the investment and hopefully provide a return.
I See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
20 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Lujan, 733 F. Supp. 419, 438 (D. D.C. 1990).
The maximum permit term under SMCRA is five years. SMCRA § 506(b), 30
U.S.C. § 1256(b) (1988).
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It doesn't happen all at once. With all that is involved, you
don't decide to commence mining operations without a buyer,
or at least without strong assurances of an available market. But
you can't line up a buyer until you have something to sell. And
you don't have something to sell until you have amassed suffi-
cient contiguous coal properties to make up a mining unit in
which your investment can be justified. That process takes time,
and the end result is never certain until it's done.
Because permits are of relatively short duration, they are not
applied for until the decision is made to commence the mining
operation. Indeed, they cannot be obtained until that time and
well beyond, because their approval depends upon the submis-
sion of reasonably specific information about the mining oper-
ation. 2 3 So a mining company will not, and really cannot, have
applied for the permits necessary for a specific mining operation
until it has made a decision to commence that operation and
has developed reasonably detailed plans for doing so.
It's a little bit like a savings bank. You can't withdraw money
from it unless you've put money into it. You normally make
deposits and build up your account over time, so that the mo-
ney's there when you need it. And you don't fill out the with-
drawal slip until you're ready to make the withdrawal.
Or imagine that you bought a chocolate bar. You take it
home and put it in the refrigerator, partly because you like your
chocolate bars cold and crispy and partly because you're waiting
for the precise moment when your hunger is such that the
chocolate bar will provide maximum enjoyment. Several days go
by, and you look at the chocolate bar in your refrigerator and
savor it, but the time is not right.
And then Congress passes a law finding that chocolate is
bad for people and prohibiting its further consumption. But it
makes that prohibition "subject to valid existing rights." The
Office of Chocolate Management adopts a regulation which
defines VER to exist when you have taken the wrapper off the
chocolate bar. You say that's unfair-you bought the chocolate
bar, you plan to eat it when the time is right, and in fact you
look forward to eating it. Besides, you say that no one can
qualify for the "exemption" because you don't take a wrapper
off a chocolate bar until you're ready to eat it.
I See, e.g., SMCRA §§ 507, 508, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1258; 30 C.F.R. Parts 778-
80, 783-85.
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You're right, of course. And you don't get your permits to
mine until you're ready to mine. But that doesn't make the
chocolate bar, or the coal properties, any less yours. This is a
serious problem with the modified all permits test: it simply
doesn't operate to protect the valid existing property rights that
are involved.
A final problem with the modified all permits test is a direct
result of this failure to address the real issues. Because it stops
well short of providing any protection against unconstitutional
"takings"-a protection Congress clearly intended204-it offers
no finality. It will, in the normal case, simply be step one of a
two-step process. The second step will be the takings claim and
the ensuing court litigation, threatening federal and state gov-
ernments and taxpayers with recurrent and substantial costs.
For these reasons, the modified all permits test is not ac-
ceptable as a definition of VER. There is no problem with it as
far as it goes, but it doesn't go far enough because it doesn't
address the real issues. The Secretary has recognized as much in
his representations that this test is intended to be one way-but
not the only. way-to establish VER.25 But that admission sounds
the death knell. Since there are other ways to establish VER,
the failure to pass the modified all permits test does not mean
you don't have VER. You must then look to the other ways,
which means they too must be defined. In short, by its failure
to constitute an exclusive test for VER, the modified all permits
test does not implement the exemption.
C. The Takings Test
This regulatory option has a clear, significant and twofold
advantage. First, it absolutely avoids constitutional infirmity by
expressly adopting the constitutional takings standard as its own.
Second, it carries out the clear will of Congress that the VER
exemption, at an irreducible minimum, be used to avoid tak-
ings .206
Despite these advantages, a takings test would be exceedingly
difficult to administer. Takings analysis is complex, even for the
courts. Passing that burden on to the regulatory authorities who
' See supra notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
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must make VER determinations in the first instance would seem
unfair and would almost certainly produce inconsistent results.
Moreover, the difficulty of the issues and the likelihood of
inconsistent results would almost certainly assure that most VER
determinations made under a takings test would be appealed.
Importantly, a takings test would also fail to implement the
VER exemption as fully as Congress intended. As we have seen,
the mere application of the takings standard would not serve to
protect all valid existing property rights.207 The latter are a far
larger universe.
For different reasons, therefore, the takings-based approach
suffers the same fatal flaws as the modified all permits test-it
fails to fully achieve the will of Congress or to provide the
important goal of achieving reasonable finality. Its application
is simply too difficult to make it the regulatory option of choice.
D. Ownership and Authority Test
This is the regulatory option that offers the greatest number
of benefits and strikes the most appropriate balance between the
congressionally-intended protection of the environment and pro-
tection of property rights. First, it is a test that is not particularly
difficult to administer. It does not require a complicated takings
analysis, but, like the modified all permits test, involves a review
of documents. This test is somewhat more complex than the
modified all permits test in that it involves some additional
interpretation of the documents; however, that interpretation is
easily within the competence of the regulatory authorities to
provide, and to provide with substantial consistency.
Second, although this approach would not necessarily elim-
inate all takings claims, it would substantially limit the number
of such claims. As such, it would provide a reasonable degree
of finality to the administrative VER determination. It would be
a one-step process (the VER determination) in most cases, unlike
the modified all permits test, which will routinely be a two-step
process (the VER determination and the follow-up taking claim).
Third, this regulatory approach is rational. It recognizes and
protects valid existing property rights, as Congress intended. But
it does so in a balanced and concessionary way, in that it focuses
not on pure ownership (and therefore stops well short of pro-
' See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
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tecting all valid existing property rights) but on an ownership
acquired with mining rights and expectations attached. Unlike
the modified all permits approach, this option does pass the
chocolate bar test2 0 -it does address the real issues presented by
the exemption.
Fourth, the ownership and authority test gives real meaning
to Section 522(e) of the Act. It creates a significant difference
between the universe of prohibitions on mining and the universe
of exemptions from those prohibitions.
Misunderstanding about this last point provides the major
argument launched against this test by those who oppose mining.
They claim that an ownership and authority definition of VER
would create an exemption so broad that it would effectively
eliminate the prohibitions, and thus render Section 522(e) mean-
ingless. Those charges may have some validity when made against
a pure ownership test, but they fail in the context of an own-
ership and authority approach. For instance, VER would not
exist under the ownership and authority test where there is
ownership but no authority to mine or the authority to mine is
unclear under applicable state law. For another instance, the
federal government is by far the single largest owner of coal
reserves in the United States. By not leasing coal in the critical
Section 522(e) prohibition areas, it will avoid any application of
VER under the ownership and authority test to that very sub-
stantial percentage of coal.
In addition to these specific and significant instances where
the VER exemption would not apply from day one, it must be
remembered that the legislative prohibitions are prospective. The
ownership and authority test would freeze the universe of ex-
emptions to those which met the test at a particular moment in
time. As such, the already substantial difference that existed
between the ban areas and the exemption areas when SMCRA
was passed will become larger with each passing year. The claim
that the ownership and authority test swallows the prohibitions
and makes Section 522(e) meaningless, therefore, is simply not
accurate.
E. The Ownership Test
This regulatory option, which is the one most favorable to
the mining industry, is supportable based on the argument that
' See supra text following note 203.
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it most fully protects property rights. In the view of the authors,
however, it is not an acceptable option because it is legitimately
subject to the charges made against the ownership and authority
test: it is simply too broad to represent a fair or proper balance
between the congressionally intended protection of the environ-
ment and protection of property rights.
The problem, in more specific terms, is that all coal is owned
by someone. Without the substantial limitation imposed by the
"authority" requirement of the ownership and authority test,
and with no restriction on transferability, the exemption would
be virtually universal. Such a result makes this an unacceptable
option, because it opens the exemption too wide.
V. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
We earlier identified five critical objectives for a regulatory
definition of VER. Two are non-negotiable: the regulation must
properly implement Section 522(e), finding the congressionally
intended distance between the prohibitions and the exemption,
and it must otherwise comply with law, including the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. The three remaining objectives
are highly desirable: the regulation should be reasonably easy to
administer, it should produce predictable and consistent results,
and it should offer some promise that its application will produce
reasonable finality.
We have identified and evaluated five regulatory options.
None is perfect. But of the five, the ownership and authority
test is easily the preferred alternative. Only that test meets both
of the requirements and also substantially achieves the three
remaining objectives.
Those who oppose mining not surprisingly favor the modi-
fied all permits test because that test would effectively eliminate
the VER exemption. A preference for that test, however, finds
no basis in an analysis of the objectives that a regulation should
accomplish. It merely reflects a policy preference.
But it is for the Congress to establish the policy, and Con-
gress has done so. It created a level playing field in Section
522(e): it included words of exemption just as much as words
of prohibition.
Those who view SMCRA as a purely environmental statute
would do well to remember that before Congress said the first
word about environmental protection, it found that "coal mining
operations presently contribute significantly to the Nation's en-
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ergy requirements; . . . and it is ... essential to the national
interest to ensure the existence of an expanding and economically
healthy underground coal mining industry .... -209 Consistent
with that finding, Congress made it a purpose of the Act to
"encourage the full utilization of coal resources ' ' 21 0 and to "as-
sure that the coal supply essential to the Nation's energy require-
ments, and to its economic and social well-being, is provided
and strike a balance between protection of the environment ...
and the Nation's need for coal as an essential source of en-
ergy ... 21
In this way, as in its protection of property rights through
the VER exemption, Congress gave unmistakable notice that its
legislative program for environmental protection is not absolute.
It must be balanced against other important objectives. That
message must be heard. The proper balance between the prohi-
bitions and the exemption must be struck. Of the alternatives
conceived to date, the ownership and authority test represents
the only workable option which achieves that result.
C)
- SMCRA § 101(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1988).
0 SMCRA § 102(k), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(k) (1988).
21 SMCRA § 102(0, 30 U.S.C. § 1202(0 (1988).
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